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Introduction 
About 12 years ago, in 2004, the Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA) conducted on 
behalf of the Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR) a study entitled ‘Remittances as a development 
tool. What options for governments’.1 This research fitted within the global (re)-discovery of the 
potential importance of remittances for development at that time. Despite academic attention in the 
1970s for money sent by migrants from the Global North to the Global South, the international 
interest in the phenomenon erupted in full force at the end of the last century when the World Bank 
published figures showing that registered remittances amounted to more than 100 billion euro. This 
financial flow was several times higher than official development assistance from North to South. 
Estimates even suggested that unregistered remittances would be higher than registered transfers. As 
a result of the publication of these figures, scientific institutions, governments and NGOs tried to 
identify and analyse the development impact of remittances – as was the case in Belgium with the 
VLIR study. 
More than a decade later, much has happened. International remittances to developing countries 
continued to increase, up to an amount of around US$ 600 billion registered remittances in 2014 
(World Bank 2016). In addition, there has been an exponential growth in research on remittances 
(about the senders, the receivers, the purposes, the development impact, ...), and the interaction 
between migration and development – there is even an academic Journal entitled ‘Migration and 
Development’. In the policy arena, several international institutions and national development agen-
cies have developed policies on the relation between migration and development and launched 
forums for discussion between various stakeholders (e.g. the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development). The private sector has not been idle either, and has discovered the remittances market: 
both banks, money transfer companies and telecommunications companies and microfinance 
institutions provide services worldwide to send and receive money. 
While internationally a considerable amount of progress is made with regards to policy development 
and implementation, it remained fairly quiet in Belgium. Despite repeated signs of awareness in Bel-
gian policy circles for the possible contribution of remittances to development, relatively few policy 
initiatives have been developed and implemented. This can be illustrated by the Policy Declaration 
of the Minister of Development Cooperation Alexander De Croo in 2014 in which reference is made 
to a profound reflection on remittances as a tool for achieving development goals, but to which up 
until now very little action has been taken.2  
This paper presents the available information on the importance of remittances from Belgium to 
developing countries and discusses the main obstacles and opportunities for leveraging the develop-
ment impact of these financial flows. Inspired by international insights, the paper concludes with a 
list of recommendations for the Belgian policy. The paper is written for 11.11.11 for the preparation 
of their campaign in 2017 on the contribution of migrants to development. The paper is based on a 
review of the available literature and databases, interviews with representatives of the Belgian 
government, civil society, the academic world and the private sector (see annex) in the period July to 
October.  In addition three focus group interviews with members of the Afghan, Filippino and 
Congolese (of the Democratic Republic (DR)) diaspora were organized in February-May 2017 to 
validate the results.  
 
1  The original study Migrantentransfers als ontwikkelingsinstrument. Wat kan de overheid doen? is only available in Dutch (see De Bruyn 
& Wets 2004) 
2  In the original text: ‘De regering zal een grondige reflectie organiseren over hoe remittances mee als hefboom zouden kunnen dienen 
voor het realiseren van ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen.’/’ Le gouvernement organisera une réflexion approfondie sur la façon don’t les 
rémittances (de l’anglais remittance) pourraient contribuer à produire un effet de levier dans la réalisation des objectifs de 
développement’. (De Croo, p. 15). 
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After introducing the concept of remittances and the main remittance channels, the paper presents 
the available figures on the volume of remittances from Belgium. This is followed by a discussion of 
the potential development impact of remittances and the main obstacles to leverage these effects. 
The main policy options proposed and suggested internationally - as well as the state of affairs in 
Belgium - are presented in the subsequent chapter. The paper concludes with policy recommenda-
tions for Belgium. Important to note is that these recommendations are in first instance directed 
towards 11.11.11 and in second instance to the Belgian government.  
1. Remittances and remittance channels 
In this paper, remittances refer to cross-border financial transfers of migrants and people with 
a migration background to their country of origin. Remittances encompass thus money sent by 
the diaspora of a certain country – regardless of the current nationality of the sender. Other 
definitions and interpretations of remittances exist and this diversity of definitions may lead to 
confusion in interpreting the importance and characteristics of the phenomenon. In its broadest 
sense, remittances refer to cash, in-kind (cars, goods, ...) or even non-material transfers from one 
place to another – not necessarily by migrants or the diaspora. Boxes 1 and 2 highlight two other 
types of remittances.  
Box 1: social remittances 
Social remittances refer to ideas, behaviours, and social capital that flow between diaspora communities and 
the communities in the country of origin (Levitt 1998). This also includes skills and beliefs that return migrants or 
circular migrants bring back to their countries of origin (e.g. India and ICT) (Adams, et al. 2012). More broadly 
the debate on social remittances fits within the discussion of political, cultural and social influences (including 
ideas about gender, race, and class identity) that migrant communities and countries of origin have on each 
other – thus recognizing that not only the cultures, habits and values of the countries/communities of origin 
may have profound influence on the diaspora communities - but that there is also a an influence in the 
opposite direction (Boccagini & Decimo 2013). Social remittances have received an increasing amount of 
attention in academic circles, but policy initiatives to tap into their development potential are still scarce.  
 
Box 2: internal remittances 
While cross-border remittances are the focus of most attention, internal or national remittances are much less 
researched and there is a dearth of figures about their size in most countries. Nevertheless, case studies show 
that for many households the financial contribution of family members working in other parts of the same 
country and sending money home is a crucial source of income. The potential development impact of 
internal remittances might be even much higher than that of international remittances. This is especially true 
for rural households since several studies have highlighted that internal remittances go to rural households. 
International remittances on the other hand are mostly sent to urban households (since international migration 
is dominated by migration from urban centres) (Adams et al. 2012). 
Important for the analysis of remittances is an understanding of the manner in which they are trans-
ferred between sender and receiver – and more specifically the difference between formal and infor-
mal channels.  
Formal remittances refer to those remittances which enter a country through formalized financial 
institutions. The amounts are registered officially. Institutions managing formal remittance channels 
include banks, money transfer agencies, postal banks and micro-finance institutions. Formal remit-
tance methods include cash-based electronic transfers, electronic account-to-account transfers, card 
based and paper based transfers.3 
 
3  See documentation of the National Bank of Belgium for an overview of the companies that are licensed to provide remittance 
services in Belgium: https://www.nbb.be/nl/financieel-toezicht/prudentieel-toezicht/toezichtsdomeinen/betalingsinstellingen-en-
instellingen-4 
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In Belgium, remittance providers or ‘payment institutions’ are all subject to the prudential supervision 
of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB).4 The main money transfer operators include Moneygram, 
Moneytrans, Travelex/Western Union, Ria, LCC. In recipient countries they either have their own 
agencies or have set up partnerships with other financial institutions (including banks, microfinance 
institutions, postal offices) that provide a service point for receiving remittances. In Belgium 
Travelex/Western Union has also signed an agreement with the Belgian postal services. These trans-
fer operators are specialized in a number of remittance corridors (e.g. Belgium-DR Congo, Belgium–
Afghanistan) and for certain corridors also banks based in Belgium play an important role, for 
instance Moroccan and Turkish Banks. Although some transfer operators have a Belgian license, 
most of these have their headquarters in another country of the European Economic Area (and are 
therefore governed by the law of that country) but have a branch in Belgium and are thus allowed to 
perform payment services. Due to its conducive regulation, the UK is a popular host country.  
While cash-to-cash transfers are still a very popular method to transfer money, electronic account-
to-account transfers via the internet are becoming more utilized. Most transfer operators also offer 
this service, and some companies even offer only this transfer model (e.g. Worldremit).  
Informal remittance channels include money brought by friends or relatives or by the sender him/herself 
(‘en valise’ or ‘par envelope’), and through informal transfer agencies (known as hawala or hundi in 
various parts of the world - see box 3). By their very nature it is difficult to measure these flows, 
but case studies suggest that they might be as big as the formal remittance flows (Adams et 
al. 2012).  
Box 3: hawala or hundi 
The system is similar to the formal transfer agencies. In this system the sender deposits money to an interme-
diary (an informal transfer agent), who contacts an agent in the country of origin. The latter is responsible for 
giving the equivalent of the money - that the sender has given to the intermediary - to the recipient. An 
informal exchange rate is used to determine the amount of money the recipient gets in return. The recipient 
can take the money from the agent by using a code, that s/he receives from the sender or by identifying 
him/herself to the agent. Because there are no official documents used in the process – although informally it 
is often documented - the system is based on trust. Depending on the region these money transfer agencies 
have different names (e.g. Hawala in Eastern Africa and Hundi in Bangladesh) (De Bruyn & Wets 2006). 
The choice of remittance channel is dependent on a number of factors, including the trans-
action costs, the time and the physical accessibility. Some countries or regions even lack any 
formal possibilities to receive money, making informal channels the only option. In addition the 
status of the sender also influences his or her possibilities since formal channels require an official 
identification document. Informal channels have also received considerable negative media and 
policy attention because they are (perceived) to be used as ways to finance terrorist activities or to 
launder money. For this reason, some governments have tried (sometimes successfully) to close down 
informal remittance option for certain countries – thereby also closing down the only remittance 
options for bona fide remittance senders and receivers (De Bruyn et al. 2004, Adams et al. 2012, 
IFAD & the World Bank 2015, Mulembu 2014). 
The table below provides an overview of the main advantages and disadvantages of the different 
remittance channels according to the literature (see amongst others De Bruyn et al. 2004 and Kosse 
& Vermeulen 2014). These are of course broad generalisations and are subject to large variations 
depending on the context. Further in the paper these factors will be discussed in more detail, but first 
we look at the importance of remittances in volume and development impact. 
 
4  Their status is regulated by the law (in Dutch): de wet van 21 december 2009 op het statuut van de betalingsinstellingen en van de 
instellingen voor elektronisch geld, de toegang tot het bedrijf van betalingsdienstaanbieder en tot de activiteit van uitgifte van 
elektronisch geld en de toegang tot betalingssystemen, see https://www.nbb.be/doc/cp/nl/psd/wg/pdf/law_21-12-
2009_04_2014.pdf. 
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Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of remittances channels for sender and receivers 
Remittance method Advantage Disadvantage 
Banks (cash based or online) Secure and relatively quick (if between 
agencies of the same bank) 
Costs might be high; limited 
availability of banks in certain regions; 
bank account required for receiver; 
might be slow process if between 
different banks, internet connections 
required (in case of online) 
Money transfer agency (cash 
based) 
Easy process; fast transfer; secure; 
large presence of agencies in lot of 
regions 
High costs 
Money transfer agency (online) Easy process; low costs Requirement of internet connection 
Postal offices (cash based) Large network in receiving countries Slow transfer; limited number of 
postal offices services. 
Mobile phone based transfer Easy process Limited availability for international 
transfers 
Hybrid methods (Micro finance 
institutions connecting with banks; 
postal services with money transfer 
agencies) 
Larger network in receiving countries; 
possibility of linking remittances to 
other financial services 
Limited availability 
Informal transfer agencies Low costs; easy process; physical 
accessibility 
Security 
2. Volume of remittance 
Despite the international attention for remittances, it is rather difficult to find correct and reliable 
country-specific data about the volume of remittances. While by their very nature, information about 
informal remittances is hard to come by, it is surprising that this is also true for remittances sent 
through formal channels. For this study we looked at the available public information sources and 
enquired for additional data with public or private instances but unfortunately we conclude that 
there are no reliable data available about the total volume of formal remittances nor about 
specific destination countries for Belgium. The absence of this information renders it difficult to 
design appropriate and targeted policy measures aimed at increasing the development potential of 
remittances.  
The main sources of information on remittance flows include the World Bank, the National Bank of 
Belgium, money transfer companies, and case study research.  
World Bank and IMF 
As a starting point we can take the most frequently cited sources of information on the size of remit-
tances: the World Bank and the IMF. A specific department within the World Bank calculates annual 
remittance flows based on data from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database and data 
releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country desks (see Ratha & 
Shaw 2007). They keep track of global and regional remittance flows and publish regularly briefings 
and factbooks.5 According to their data collection systems, in 2015 word-wide remittances exceeded 
US$ 601 billion, of which about US$ 441 billion went to developing countries.  
 
5  see http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues 
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According to the World Bank’s latest calculations, about US$ 4.5 billion was sent abroad in 
2014 from Belgium. This represents more than a doubling in twelve years time, as figure 1 shows, 
making Belgium the 23rd remittance sending country in the world.  
Figure 1 Remittances from Belgium 2002-2014 (in million euro), according to World Bank estimates 
 
Source World Bank Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Apr. 2016)6 
Table 2 shows that high income countries account for the bulk of these remittances. According to 
the calculations of the World Bank, France is by far the main recipient of remittances sent from 
Belgium – i.e. 38% of all remittances. Besides Morocco and the PR China all other countries in the 
top ten are also EU member states. The least developed countries would only receive 0.8% of all 
remittances from Belgium. Also surprising is the low representation of a number of countries with a 
high diaspora in Belgium, notably the DR Congo (only receiving 1 million US$ in remittances), and 
Turkey (that would receive only 0.8% of all remittances).  
 
 
6  http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data 
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Table 2 Remittance recipient regions from Belgium, according to income level, in 2015 
Income level (and five highest ranked countries) Total remittances  
(in million US$) 
Proportion of total remittances 
(in % of total amount) 
Least developed countries 42 0.8 
Senegal 10 0.2 
Togo 7 0.1 
Nepal 6 0.1 
Bangladesh 5 0.1 
Rwanda 4 0.1 
Other Low income countries 0 0 
Lower Middle income countries 837 14.8 
Morocco 483 8.5 
Nigeria 99 1.8 
India 77 1.4 
Philippines 30 0.5 
Pakistan 29 0.5 
Upper Middle Income Countries 413 7.3 
PR China 118 2.1 
Serbia 62 1.1 
Turkey 44 0.8 
Thailand 33 0.6 
Lebanon 30 0.5 
Higher income countries 4362 77.1 
France 2135 37.8 
Italy 388 6.9 
Spain 362 6.4 
Germany 307 5.4 
Luxembourg 226 4.0 
Total 5654 100 
Source http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-
remittances-data 
However, these figures are misleading because of a variety of reasons. Several countries do not pos-
sess all the required these data and even where they are collected different definitions might be used 
(World Bank Group 2016). Moreover, data do not take into account money sent by the larger part of 
the diaspora – i.e. second or third generation migrants.  
In addition, the definition used by the World Bank and the IMF does not only encompass money 
transfers of migrants but also wages and remuneration of migrant workers and social benefits. Espe-
cially for Belgium this has important consequences. For instance, Belgium would have received 
about US$ 11.4 billion in remittances in the same year making the country one of the main 
recipients of remittances worldwide. In addition, there is a threefold increase since 2002.7 This 
apparent anomaly is explained by the high concentration of international institutions, e.g. the EU and 
NATO. These wages make up the bulk of the total amount of remittances from Belgium. 
 
7 World Bank Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Apr. 2016), see 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data 
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National Bank of Belgium 
A better picture of remittances from Belgium might have been provided by the National Bank of 
Belgium (NBB). However, also the NBB does not possess exact information – its figures are based on 
estimates and extrapolations of available data.8 In addition, the reporting system changed in 2006. 
Prior to that year, financial institutions were required to report all transactions with foreign countries 
which they carried out for their customers and for their own account, provided that the amount was 
greater than 12,500 euros. Additional estimates for transactions that were below this threshold were 
made on reported figures for 1992-1993 when the threshold was not yet in place. These figures 
excluded thus small payments – the bulk of the remittances sent by migrants. After 2006 a new 
reporting system was put in place. As a result of administrative simplifications and to align the 
requirements for Belgian and non-Belgian banks, the reporting obligation was limited. Instead the 
data collection system was (and still is) based on money transfers that are communicated to the NBB 
on a voluntary basis by the postal system (which has an agreement for remittance services with 
Western Union/Travelex). Those data are supplemented with estimates, based on previous expe-
rience. The advantage of the current system is that it does take into account relative small money 
transfers and collects data from at least one money transfer agency. However, data from other money 
transfer agencies or financial institutions such as banks is thus not directly included (nor money sent 
through Travelex via other channels). The NBB only makes an estimated guess of what is sent 
through these channels. Due these shortcomings, the NBB is reluctant to provide data on the 
geographical distribution of migrant remittances – according to a representative of the NBB, this 
would only give a very distorted and incomplete picture.9  
Figure 2 Remittances from Belgium according to estimates of the National Bank of Belgium (in million 
euro) 
 
Source Communication with National Bank Belgium 
 
8 Information provided by representatives of the NBB (by mail or phone). Surprisingly, in a very recent Eurostat press release (Eurostat 
2016), the institution mentions that 252 million euro would be remitted intra EU and 256 million euro to non-EU countries. However, due 
to the above mentioned shortcoming, this figure does not reflect the reality.  An additional question could be raised about the other 
EU countries in the Eurostat survey. It was beyond the scope of this study to assess the reliability of remittance figures from other EU 
countries. The Eurostat press release (as does the World Bank) makes comparisons with other European countries (but given the 
Belgian data collection challenges, the reliability of the other data collection methods should be assessed before making statements 
about these figures).   
9 Information provided by representatives of the NBB (by mail or phone). 
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Figure 2 provides an overview of the evolution of global migrant remittances (as understood as per-
sonal transfers) sent from Belgium between 2003 and 2016. In 2015 the total amount of remit-
tances would sent from Belgium amounts to 508 million euro according to the NBB. 
Important to note is that these figures include remittances sent to all countries abroad, thus not only 
to the developing world. However, since the main data source includes remittances sent through 
Travelex via the postal service, the largest proportion of these remittances refer to countries that have 
inaccessible account-to-account banking services. From personal communication with 
representatives of the NBB it may be concluded that these estimations are so low that they do not 
reflect reality. All other sources of formal remittance channels together (incl. Turkish and Moroccan 
based and other banks, Moneygram, Moneytrans, Ria, LCC and Western Union via other channels) 
are estimated to be not even half of the remittance sent through the postal service via Travelex. This 
means that the real figure could be a number of times higher. A very rough guess would be – 
considering that the NBB number does not include sizeable flows to other European countries for 
which bank-to-bank transfers are used, and underestimate the importance of other money transfer 
operators - four to ten times higher – bringing the total of registered remittances at 2 to 5 billion 
euro.  
Other sources 
A third source of information would be direct data coming from remittance service providers. This would 
indeed provide the most reliable data on formal remittances. However, banks as well as money 
transfer agencies are reluctant to provide this information to third parties. The most appropriate 
institution to compile this information is the NBB, but as mentioned above it does not do this. 
Making this information public might endanger their competitive advantage, since each of the trans-
fer agencies is specialized in specific remittance corridors. From personal communication with 
representatives of transfer agencies and from the academic literature (e.g. IFAD 2015) it can be 
concluded that on average remittance senders send three to four times annually an amount of 
between 200 and 400 euro. It needs to be stressed that this is an average. For instance the focus 
group interviews with Filipino, Congolese and Afghan diaspora members as well as other case studies 
(see below) show that there are big differences between the communities.  
A fourth source of information are research case studies. For Belgium examples include the surveys 
among 400 members Moroccan diaspora and a same amount of the Turkish diaspora in 2007 and 
2008 (De Bruyn et al. 2008), and a survey 113 members of the Congolese (DR Congo), Ghanaian 
and Moroccan diaspora in Antwerp of 2011 (Michielsen et al. 2011). Other examples include Merla 
(2012) for migrants from el Salvador, Boon & Ahenkan (2012) for the Ghanaian diaspora, Bentour 
(2014) for the Moroccan diaspora, Bettin (2012) for the African diaspora, Cosemans & Goddeeris 
(2013) for the India diaspora, and Lafleur & Lizin (2014) for the Congolese diaspora. These studies 
do not allow an extrapolation of the total amount of remittances sent, due to methodological issues 
(and it was also not the aim of these studies to calculate the total volume of remittances). However, 
they do provide an insight in remittance behaviour and motivations. They also show that not 
all people with a migration background send remittances - for instance only one third of the adult 
Moroccan and Turkish diaspora send money according to the survey of De Bruyn et al. (2008). More-
over, there are large differences between the diaspora communities (in terms of amount, channels 
used, objectives) and that though remittances are primarily sent to family relatives, also a proportion 
is transferred for community objectives.  
A proxy indicator for the importance of remittance-corridors for Belgium – i.e. the main des-
tination countries of remittances - can be the size of the diaspora (or community with a specific 
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migrant background). Table 3 gives an overview of main diaspora groups from non-high income 
countries in Belgium. 
Table 3 Population of migrant background from non-high income countries 2015 
 Population of migration background % in total population of migrant 
background 
Morocco 468687 15.2 
Turkey 242133 7.9 
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 82296 2.7 
Algeria 51.449 1.7 
Tunisia 39617 1.3 
India 29337 1.0 
PR China 24056 0.8 
Pakistan 22815 0.7 
Serbia/Montenegro 20378 0.7 
Rwanda 19711 0.6 
Cameroon 19300 0.6 
Philipines 16940 0.6 
Iran 16435 0.5 
Syria 13846 0.5 
Brazil 13482 0.4 
Guinee 13476 0.4 
Afghanistan 13049 0.4 
Ghana 12981 0.4 
Iraq 11986 0.4 
Armenië 11404 0.4 
Albania 11330 0.4 
Lebanon 11246 0.4 
Thailand 10999 0.3 
Viet Nam 10063 0.3 
Macedonia 8843 0.3 
Chili 8705 0.3 
Nigeria 8524 0.3 
Colombia 8021 0.3 
Ukraine 7852 0.3 
Burundi 7274 0.2 
Angola 7258 0.2 
Togo 7014 0.2 
Bosnië-Herzegowina 6559 0.2 
Ecuador 6486 0.2 
Source For a description of the methodology and sources of info, see 
http://community.dewereldmorgen.be/blog/janhertogen/2015/09/04/migratieachtergrond-per-nationaliteit-
en-gewest-in-belgie-2015 
  
14 
Conclusion: Educated estimates 
In conclusion, there is a clear lack of remittance figures from Belgium. The current figures range 
from 500 million euro (NBB) to some 1.5 billion US$ (World Bank) for remittances sent to 
non-high income countries in this chapter we have explained why these figures do not reflect the 
reality of formal remittance channels, and will most probably be several times higher. The amount of 
informal remittances thus not taken into account. Without a reliable view on the registered remittance 
to specific countries it is very difficult to identify the remittance corridors for which formalized 
systems are limited (this could be done by comparing the size of the diaspora with the amount of 
remittance sent through formal channels), or to design policies for leveraging developmental impact 
of remittances for specific countries. The only means to address this problem is an improvement 
of the Belgian governments’ data collection system of formal remittances by urging 
remittance service providers to communicate their data to the NBB at regular times.  
3. Development impact of remittances  
The development impact of remittances - and broader of migration in general - has been a very 
popular topic of research of the last decade, and despite the large volume of studies, the debate is still 
ongoing.  
Main theories 
De Haas (2007) has provided one of the clearest overviews by framing the impact of remittances and 
migration on development within the main development theories. Broadly there are three view-
points: the migration optimists, the pessimists and a more nuanced viewpoint. The migration 
optimists’ views are rooted within the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s and argue that 
migration is a means to better distribute the resources around the world. Migrants move towards 
locations where there is a high demand for labour and send remittances back to their country of 
origin. In addition, upon return, migrants also share their newly acquired skills and experience with 
their community. The migration pessimists, whose theories crystallized in the 1970s and are linked to the 
dependencia theories of the 1970s came to the opposite conclusion that migration actually reinforces 
or at best sustains underdevelopment. The most productive members of the community depart which 
result in a brain drain, a shortage of labour as well as a dependency on remittances. The more nuanced 
view developed in the 1980s and 1990s under the influence of the New Economies of Labour Migra-
tion and the livelihood approaches. These theorists approach the issue from the household perspec-
tive instead of the individual migrants and argue that depending on contextual factors migration as 
well as remittances can have positive or negative impacts.  
The impact will vary according to the level (country, regional, community, household or indi-
vidual) as well as the type of effect (economic, social, cultural, political) looked at. Furthermore 
remittances might impact different on the sending than on the receiving actors or regions. As 
Vaes et al. (2014) have argued, depending on the specific viewpoint taken, migration as well as policy 
measures attached to it, will have different effects. Most academics have studied the economic effects 
on each of the aforementioned levels – albeit in receiving areas. The general consensus is that 
remittances are in essence private financial flows aimed at addressing needs of individuals 
or households. Since these households are often concentrated in a specific community or region 
(according to specific migration corridors), the remittances will also impact on the community (some-
times even directly in the case of Home Town Associations – see further). Due to the size, all 
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remittances taken together will inevitably have consequences on the region or country level. 
Figure 3 shows this graphically. 
Figure 3 Communicating vessels of remittances 
 
Source De Bruyn & Wets 2006 
Before delving deeper into the impact of remittances it is important to note is that the remittance 
behaviour of senders (and receivers) evolves in time. Broadly four different phases can be dis-
cerned – keeping in mind that there are many variations (for instance, migrants who do not return to 
their country of origin). Each of these phases requires different remittance services to be designed 
(to which we will return in chapter about policy options). 
Figure 4 migration process and evolution remittance behaviour 
 
Development impact on different levels 
Table 4 on the next page gives an overview of the impacts of remittances on different levels.  
At the household level, one of the most often heard criticisms about remittances is, that they are mostly 
used for consumption purposes instead of productive investments (Chami et al. 2003). Nevertheless, 
many families they constitute an important source of revenue. This extra income allows them to meet 
their basic needs or to overcome periods of economic crisis, shocks (De Haas 2007). It can also open 
up opportunities to invest in family’s well-being, education of children, improvement of the family’s 
health status and so on. Some case studies show even that remittances are directly inserted into 
educational, health or business projects (Adams et al. 2012). In some countries, remittances form a 
major source of money for parental support and, as such, act as a kind of social security resource 
Remittances
Micro
(privat)
Meso
(group)
Macro
(society)
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base for vulnerable groups (see also for more examples in Morocco De Haas 2003, for Bangladesh 
Mahapatro 2015 and Sikder & Higgins 2016, for the Philippines Yang & Choi 2007, and Mexico 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. & Pozo 2011a and b).  
At the regional and community level, increased consumption can give a boost to the local economy and 
smoothen income inequalities. On the other hand, it can also result in rising inequalities between 
families receiving remittances and those who do not. Moreover, the poorest population groups often 
do not possess the financial means to undertake an international migration. Hence, they are excluded 
for receiving remittances. Inflation can be another effect of a large inflow of remittances in a region. 
Moreover, also families and regions can become dependent on remittances, and neglecting productive 
activities (Adams et al. 2012). On the other hand, several migrant communities remit money to their 
region of origin to develop social and economic infrastructure. The Home Town Associations of 
Mexican communities residing in the US are among the best known examples (Orozco and Welle 
2006, Alarcon 2002).  
At the country level, remittances are an important source of income strengthening the balance of 
payments. Especially small countries with a relatively large diaspora rely on remittances. For instance 
remittances account for almost 30% of Nepal GDP and for one quarter of that of Liberia, Haiti and 
Moldova and 17% of countries such as Palestine, Honduras and El Salvador (World Bank Group 
2016). Still, as Adams et al. (2012) conclude from a review of the literature, it is debatable whether 
remittances impact positively economic growth. They explain this by the difficulty of singling out 
remittances as a causal factor. It is even argued that remittances be detrimental for economic growth 
because large influxes of foreign exchange can lead to an appreciation of the local currency and thus 
making exports less competitive – also known as the Dutch disease – but also this result is question-
able. De Haas (2007) and De et al. (2016) has a more positive assessment and argues that remittances 
are a more stable financial input than other financial flows such as foreign direct investments. Even 
in times of political and economic crisis migrants tend to send remittances to support their families. 
Adams et al. (2012) refer to different studies showing how diaspora communities in for instance 
Somaliland, Nepal and Jamaica have been instrumental in providing financial support to their relatives 
after natural disasters. Rodima-Taylor (2013) has dedicated an entire publication of providing evi-
dence on how remittances contribute to supporting post-conflict societies in countries such as Liberia 
and El Salvador, while Dean (2016) discusses remittances to Syria, and Lopez-Lucia (2015) to 
Afghanistan. Danstrøm et al. (2015) analyse how Somali and Afghan diaspora organizations offer 
relief to their countries or regions of origin, while Vargas-Silva (2016) gives an overview of literature 
on remittances sent to and from refugees and internally displaced persons. Remittances even tend to 
be counter-cyclical, i.e. the remittance influx is higher in terms of crisis (Bettin et al. 2015). On the 
other hand, some academics provide evidence that remittances tend to decrease the longer the 
migrant community is establishing itself in the destination country (Gosh 2006). From his review of 
available studies, De Haas (2007) concludes that most studies argue that international remittances 
have reduced poverty directly or indirectly. An influential analysis of Adams and Page (2005) in 71 
developing countries showed that a 10 per cent increase in per capita remittances led to a 3.5 per cent 
decline in the share of people relying on less than US$ 1 a day.  
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Table 4 Impact of remittances on different levels 
 Positive impact of remittances Negative impact 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 l
ev
el
 
Allowing families to meet basic needs Dependency on remittances and neglect of local productive 
activities by families 
Opening up of opportunities for investing in 
children’s education, health care, etc. 
Hardly used for productive investment 
Loosening of constraints in family budget to 
invest in business or savings 
 
Emergency resources  
Social security resource base  
C
om
m
un
it
y 
an
d 
re
gi
on
al
 l
ev
el
 Boost of local economy Increase inequality between families who receive remittances 
and those who do not 
 Inflation 
Financing local development projects  
M
ac
ro
-e
co
no
m
ic
 l
ev
el
 
Strengthening balance of payments by provision 
of foreign exchange 
Deterioration of balance of trade, by stimulation of import 
and appreciation of local currency 
 Deterioration of the ‘social balance’ 
Remittances are stable and counter-cyclical Remittances tend to decrease as migrant community is more 
established in destination country 
 Economic dependency of remittances 
Some authors, such as Orozco (2010), also approach remittances and the (economic) impact of 
migration in a broader perspective than merely looking at the impact on receiving countries. They 
frame migration within a discourse of transnationalism, in which there is a constant exchange of ideas, 
goods and other resources between migrants and their families - and even diasporas in other parts of 
the world. The transnational character of migration gives rise to the development of new eco-
nomic sectors, including agencies, shops, that cater for these, which Orozco has called the five T’s 
of transnational development, referring to financial transfers (or remittances), transport, tele-communica-
tion, nostalgic trade, and tourism. These sectors are visible in urban areas with large diaspora commu-
nities: phone shops, busses lined up at the start of the holiday season, groceries,…  
In recent years, there is a growing attention for social and to lesser extent cultural consequences. Interestingly, 
one of the main concerns of the political world - i.e. remittances and security - has received less attention, 
despite the fact that security measures have impacted the options for sending remittances. 
Several studies have highlighted the social costs of remittances – or migration. These focus on social 
pressure on migrants to send money to their relatives and families, as well as on the consequences of 
the deconstruction of the family cohesion – either on migrants’ parents or children left behind in 
order that they could earn an income elsewhere. This has been labelled ‘care drain’ (Adams et al. 
2012). In addition, some studies have brought to the surface the existence of criminal circuits or 
political parties in which migrants are their families are forced to pay or repay political or criminal 
organizations with remittances. Examples include the case studies of the Tamil diaspora and of the 
Mexican diaspora (La 2004 and Adams et al. 2012).  
4. Obstacles for leveraging the development impact of remittances  
From a policy perspective one of the key aspects is to identify the main obstacles that inhibit the 
potential positive developmental impact of remittances – bearing in mind that this impact is very 
context specific and varies according to the development objectives.  
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Since the beginning of the 21st century, when the importance of remittances received renewed atten-
tion thanks to publications of the World Bank, academics and policy analysts have reached to a large 
extent a consensus on a number of main obstacles that inhibit the potential economic and social 
impact of remittances on the receiving communities. At the individual and household level these refer 
to the access to adequate and affordable remittance services on the one hand and the 
availability of services for the use of remittances on the other. Especially transaction costs have 
received a considerable amount of attention.  
Transaction costs and limited access to services 
On average the transaction costs of sending remittances via official channels are relatively 
high – especially for small amounts of money. According to the World Bank (2016) worldwide the 
transaction costs to send remittance would be around 7.6% with outliers to Sub-Saharan Africa to 
15%. In Europe the average would be at 7.3% (in 2014). Moreover, the costs differ according to the 
channel used. On average, banks demand higher costs than money transfer operators and in turn 
postal services are cheaper than the latter. A study of IFAD (2015) based on data of the World Bank 
showed that to send US$200 from Europe banks asked US$ 25, Money transfer organizations, about 
US$ 7 and postal services around US$ 4. The high transaction costs decrease the potential positive 
effects of remittance in a variety of ways. In a direct manner, they limit the available money remitted 
to the receiving households. For instance, the World Bank (2016) argues that a reduction of costs 
of sending remittances with 5% of the costs worldwide, would free up an amount of an 
average of US$ 16 billion dollars each year for senders or receivers of remittances. This 
additional income provides opportunities for consumption, savings, and investment in local 
economies. Indirectly, high transaction costs might deter senders to use official remittance channels, 
and hence possibilities to link remittance to other financial services which allow opportunities for 
credit, saving, or investments (Ahmed & Martinez-Zarzoso 2015, Freund & Spatafora 2008, Aycinena 
et al. 2010).  
Remittance service providers apply different costs to remit money abroad and these costs differ to 
large extents among the different providers. In general it is very difficult to get a clear oversight of 
the real costs, due to the applied exchange rates, the costs incurred by the receiving agencies and the 
method of reception or payment. This makes it also difficult to compare remittance prices in Belgium. 
Table 4 gives an example of the fees demanded by a selection of remittance providers to send 100 or 
500 euro to Ghana, Ecuador and Afghanistan via the internet. Important to note is that there will be 
additional costs incurred at the receiving end. Especially for smaller amounts and remittances to 
Ghana and Afghanistan the costs surpass the 5% mark. To this the exchange rate costs should be 
added. Also in the focus groups member of the Congolese, Afghan and Filippino diaspora asserted 
that costs incurred were considerable and the costs structure was not very transparent.  More 
extensive comparison if provided by a service offered by the World Bank – see further – which 
include other interesting factors for the consumer (see figure 5). Unfortunately, this service is only 
available for remittances to Congo, Morocco, Algeria and Turkey and some interviews with 
representatives of remittance service providers questioned the accuracy of the data. While for Latin 
American countries and certain Asian countries transaction costs have considerably 
decreased in recent years, transaction costs for Sub-Saharan countries remain relatively high 
– far above the 3% mark that or even 5% mark that was agreed by in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (which will be elaborated upon further in the next chapter). If the average 
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transaction cost would be 5% on money remitted, the total transaction costs to non-high income 
countries could amount to more than 100 million euro10.   
Table 5 Examples of fees from Belgium of selected countries and money transfer agencies on 1 
October 2016 
 Ecuador Ghana Afghanistan 
Remittance 
provider 
100 euro 500 euro 100 euro 500 euro 100 euro 500 euro 
Western 
Union 
4,90 4,90 6,90 19,90 10 - 15,50 23,50 - 31,00 
Moneygram 9 27 5,90 15 8 12 
Moneytrans 4 4 8 8 - - 
WorldRemit 3,99 3,99 4,99 12,99 - - 
Source Websites of several money transfer agencies 
 
10 This figure is based on the available – but as argued above – incomplete total remittances sent from Belgium to non-high income 
countries. For instance, if 2 billion euro would be sent to non-high income countries (which is an estimated guess, but in my opinion 
still an underestimation of the total amount), a 5% transaction cost would represent 100 million euro. Taken into account that for 
several geographic regions - in particular Sub-Saharan Africa – transaction costs are several percentages higher, also this figure will 
be an underestimation.  
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Figure 5 To send 145 euro from Belgium to the DR Congo on the 12th of May 2016 
 
 
 
Source https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en/corridor/Belgium/Congo-%28Kinshasa%29 
Physical or virtual access (via internet or mobiles phones) to remittance sending and receiv-
ing systems is another important obstacle, especially in rural and conflict or post-conflict or 
natural disaster areas. Often informal channels are the only option to send and receive remittances 
and the time needed as well as the extra physical effort to go to access the points of reception can be 
very high. In addition, in certain areas picking up or withdrawing money is also marred with safety 
risks. Also in sending countries, money transfer agencies are less present in smaller towns or rural 
areas.  For specific migration groups the access to formal remittance services is also hindered 
by their legal status. In many countries undocumented migrants cannot access formal systems 
because of the requirement of proper identification documents. Besides the channeling of remit-
tances, also factors related to the utilization for the financial transfers pose additional problems. 
Remittance service providers are often limited to merely sending and receiving money – no or very 
limited options are available to insert the money in other financial services, such as savings, 
credit, social investment, social security (Lubambu 2014).  
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Underlying causes for transaction costs limited access to services  
Several underlying causes for these obstacles have been identified. Firstly there is insufficient 
transparency of the remittance market. Remittance prices are made up of a variety of variables 
which make it difficult for consumers to compare prices. Variables include fees charged for sending 
a certain amount – and sometimes even receiving remittances – and these fees vary according to the 
amount sent (the lower the amount the higher the relative fee), a margin taken on the exchange rate. 
In addition, there are extra costs according to the way the recipient is paid out and speed of the 
transfers, fees related to how the recipient is paid out (cash or via an account), and the geographical 
locality of the recipient. Secondly there is limited competition in the remittance market, due to 
monopolies and regulation frameworks. The entrance of new actors providing remittance services 
and alliances between different actors is obstructed by the exclusive agreements between large inter-
national money transfer organizations and other actors. For instance according to an UNCTAD 
report of 2012 only two money transfer organizations (Moneygram and Western Union) control 
about two thirds of all remittance payout locations. Regulations against the financing of terrorism 
and money laundering – which especially in the aftermath of 9/11/2001 were implemented) limit the 
possibilities for smaller remittance service providers and other actors to enter the market. Thirdly, 
there is very low integration of receivers of remittances in formal financial institutions (in 
OECD countries 96% of adult population has an account, in Sub-Saharan Africa only 33%11), and 
the inadequate formal financial infrastructure in the receiving countries. Banking the unbanked – 
as it is also referred to, is therefore a priority issue. 
Obstacles for upscaling benefits of remittances 
At the community and regional level and the macro-economic or national level hindrances refer to challenges to 
distribute the benefits of remittances to non-remittance receiving households, and 
inadequate financial and economic instruments and policies in place that limit to capitalize 
on the stable and countercyclical nature of remittances for the national economy. 
The inflow of remittances can spur economic development in specific regions (as mentioned higher) 
and consequently also provide economic opportunities for non-remittance households (for instance 
demand for labour to construct houses of remittance receiving households, or a larger market for 
local shop-keepers and other businesses) – but it can also create negative effects such as inflation. To 
address these issues broader regional or even national financial and economic and labour policies 
need to be designed and implemented and local governments and civil society organizations 
strengthened. Besides these broader economic contexts and effects, remittances can also be invested 
directly in public goods and infrastructure. There are numerous examples available of diaspora 
organizations that collect money to invest in community projects12 – and although most remain rather 
modest in scale, there are some larger examples in the Philippines and Mexico. These even receive 
extra support from local governments (e.g. the three for one programme in Mexico – see below). 
Existing obstacles for these type of programmes include the limited availability of instruments that 
motivate remittance senders to invest part of their remittances for public purposes. Of course this 
has to a large extent to do with the lack of financial resources of senders (and receivers) to dedicate 
part of their remitted sums to non-personal or family related purposes However, also the lack of 
convincing and reliable possibilities (or the lack of knowledge about their existence) for senders (and 
receivers) might be an important obstacle. In turn these refer to issues such as the efficient and 
 
11  See World Bank Global Findex data: http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/ 
12 See for instance www.vierdepijler. be and http://www.migration4development.org 
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effective use of the collected remittances for collective purposes, public objectives which also 
benefit the relatives of the senders of remittances, the administrative ease to access these 
possibilities, and/or the possibility of receiving a return on investment. 
While the above mentioned factors refer directly to remittances, there are a number of broader con-
textual factors which should be addressed to minimize the negative development effect of migration. 
Firstly, the socio-economic situation of the migrant or the diaspora (for instance in terms of 
integration in the labour market) and secondly the extent to which the transnational character of 
migrants/diaspora and their family and migration is catered for in countries/regions influence 
the amount of remittances that s/he can send as well as the cultural and social impact of the migration 
process (see for instance De Haas 2007, Orozco 2010).  
Table 6 Overview of the obstacles to leverage the development impact of remittances 
Individual/household 
level 
Obstacles for using formal remittance channels: 
- High remittance transaction or other costs; 
- Limited physical or virtual access (internet, mobile phones) to remittances (rural areas, post 
conflict zones; 
- Limited legal access to remittance services for undocumented migrants. 
Obstacles for productive use of remittances: 
- Limited financial services available to utilize remittances for savings, credit, social invest-
ment, social security, economic investments. 
Community/regional/ 
national level 
Obstacles for the distribution or spill-over of benefits of remittances to non-remittance 
receiving households: 
- Limited options for use (collective) remittances for public goods and infrastructure; 
- Limited options available to capitalize the stable and countercyclical nature of remittances 
for national economy. 
Underlying causes and 
contextual factors 
Insufficient transparency of remittance market 
Limited competition and insufficient inclusion of new actors (e.g. microfinance institutions, 
mobile phone companies, postal services) due to monopolies and regulation frameworks 
Low integration of receivers of remittances in formal financial system 
Inadequate recognition of transnational character of migrant and diaspora 
Socio-economic situation of migrant or diaspora (for instance integration in labour market, 
legal status) 
5. Policy options to increase development impact of remittances 
In the last decade, a number of international institutions, in casu the World Bank, IFAD and the 
Inter-American Development Bank, have been forerunners in proposing a number of policy 
measures which address the obstacles for enhancing the economic development impact of remit-
tances identified above. As a result several international institutions (G8, G20, European Commis-
sion) recognize the potential development impact if remittances and have taken action. Importantly, 
these depart from the premise that remittances are in essence a private money flow – which is not 
necessary directed towards the poorest communities and regions, and that remittances cannot be 
regarded as a substitute for official development aid (Lubambu 2014, UNCTAD 2012).  
I. International policy frameworks 
At the international level, the main measures taken and proposed are aimed at increasing and facili-
tating the formal option to send and receive remittances on the one hand and utilizing them for 
productive purposes on the other hand. Important international documents supporting these 
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measures include the Accra agenda for Action that recognized the ‘positive contribution of migrants 
for inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries of origin, transit and destination coun-
tries’. The agenda stipulates as an objective the development of adequate and affordable financial 
services for migrants and their families in both home and host countries. The specific aim is reiterated 
in the SDGs (under goal 10): ‘By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances 
and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent’. Very recently, IFAD has launched the 
international day of family remittances, on the 16th of June.  
In 2007, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the World Bank published the 
General Principles for International remittance services13(see box) which stipulates the main focal areas to 
achieve these targets. In 2012 the World Bank published a guidance report to implement these 
principles.  
 
Box 4: General Principles for international remittance services (Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems and the World Bank) 
 
The General Principles are aimed at the public policy objectives of achieving safe and efficient international 
remittance services. To this end, the markets for the services should be contestable, transparent, accessible 
and sound. 
 
Transparency and consumer protection 
General Principle 1. The market for remittance services should be transparent and have adequate consumer 
protection. 
 
Payment system infrastructure 
General Principle 2. Improvements to payment system infrastructure that have the potential to increase the 
efficiency of remittance services should be encouraged. 
 
Legal and regulatory environment 
General Principle 3. Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, nondiscriminatory and 
proportionate legal and regulatory framework in relevant jurisdictions. 
 
Market structure and competition 
General Principle 4. Competitive market conditions, including appropriate access to domestic payment 
infrastructures, should be fostered in the remittance industry. 
 
Governance and risk management 
General Principle 5. Remittance services should be supported by appropriate governance and risk 
management practices. 
 
Roles of remittance service providers and public authorities 
A. Role of remittance service providers. Remittance service providers should participate actively in the 
implementation of the General Principles. 
 
B. Role of public authorities. Public authorities should evaluate what action to take to achieve the public 
policy objectives through implementation of the General Principles. 
Some of the measures should be taken at the international or EU level, but within the Belgian policy 
field there is no clear overview available of the progress made. This is exacerbated by the absence of 
a coherent policy on remittances or migration and development in Belgium. Information is scattered 
around different agencies and departments.  
 A prerequisite for an effective policy on remittances is therefore that efforts are made to improve coherence 
between migration and development in Belgium as well as between the Belgian and European levels.  
 
13  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/894291468313541470/pdf/388210ENGLISH01remittances01PUBLIC1.pdf 
  
24 
Below some of the main interventions areas of the recent years internationally are discussed. Where 
possible the state of affairs in Belgium is mentioned. These include increasing the transparency of 
and competition between remittance provider, reducing regulatory obstacles for remittances service 
providers, increasing exploration of new technologies, promoting financial literacy and inclusion, and 
improve data collection. Other issues which have received attention are the support for collective 
remittances with for instance matching funds, and on a broader level the engagement of the diaspora 
in development and migration policies. More contested measures include the access to remittances 
for undocumented migrants, initiatives to address remittances as tools for laundering and terrorist 
operations, and certain measures to use remittances for macro-economic purposes.  
II. Harmonizing and improve data collection methods to allow effective policy 
development 
Policy is partly based on having correct data and information on specific phenomena. The absence 
of having reliable estimates on how much remittances are sent through official channels to specific 
countries or regions, makes it difficult to identify particular needs and challenges of specific groups 
of senders and receivers, and to design policies for specific remittance corridors. At the international 
level several initiatives have been taken to harmonize and optimize the data collection systems 
between governments. Key institutions in these processes are the IMF, which released its sixth edition 
of Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) in 2009 presenting new defini-
tions of remittances. At the EU level, the European Central bank and Eurostat are responsible for 
producing and publishing the statistics for the EU. In turn they rely on the National central banks of 
the members states for collecting the correct data. The reporting requirements are stipulated in the 
Payment Services Directive (PSD) 2007/64/EC. Despite these efforts, there are still large gaps in the 
knowledge about size and global distribution of remittances.  
As explained higher, unfortunately also in Belgium there is still no information available about the 
overall size of the remittances as well as the destination countries. The current Belgian data col-
lection system is inadequate to provide a clear analysis that can act as basis for the design of an 
effective policy.  
 There is therefore a need to improve data gathering methods by for instance obliging remittances service 
providers to provide data about the volume and destination countries (via the balance of payments enquiries).  
III. Encouraging transparency of transaction and other costs 
Transparency of remittance markets is encouraged by several, mostly website based, initiatives that 
list the available remittance providers and disclose the transaction costs and other characteristics of 
their services. Examples include GeldnaarHuis.nl (the Netherlands), mandasoldiacase.it (Italy) and 
envoidargent.fr (France) (Lubambu 2014). For Belgium such a specific website is not available, but 
at the global level the World Bank has created a similar service: remittanceprices.worldbank.org (see 
also figure 5 in this report). The data is collected on regular intervals by researchers posing as 
customers with transfer institutions. For each service, two amounts are selected, the equivalent of 
US$200 and US$500. The advantage of this tool is that besides transaction fees it also presents other 
characteristics of interest of customers (such as speed of transfer). For Belgium data are only available 
for a limited number of remittance sending institutions catering for Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and 
the DR Congo. Unfortunately, there is little information available on the popularity of this 
information channels with (potential) customers. Participants to the Congolese focus group had 
never heard of the website for instance. In addition, some representatives of money transfer operators 
we interviewed questioned the reliability of the data provided. Still, a public available comparison 
instrument such as a website, could work as an awareness raising instrument for money transfer 
providers and stimulate reduction of transaction and other costs. In addition, website and 
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accompanying information campaign could address the issue of limited information about existing 
remittance channels among diaspora groups. For instance, members of the Afghan, Congolese and 
Filippino diaspora asserted that they were not aware about certain online possibilities to remit money. 
 In order to increase the transparency of the costs incurred to remit money and encourage competition, civil 
society organizations (incl. customer organizations and diaspora organizations), financial institutions or 
governmental agencies could improve the existing instruments (such as the World Bank website) to compare 
prices for other corridors and set up information campaigns among diaspora groups. Another strategy could 
be to set up a smaller campaign in which at regular intervals the prices for specific corridors (each time another 
one) prices are compared and a targeted information campaign is set up within the (potential) consumer 
community. 
IV. Adapting regulatory framework to increase competition  
At the EU level, the Payment Services Directive (PSD) 2007/64/EC, is a key document. It provides a 
harmonized regulatory framework for payments and a common legal framework between the 
member states – including thus Belgium.14 While this document addresses to a large extent the 
challenges in the regulatory European environment, larger obstacles still exist in other regions of the 
world. Especially in African countries the regulatory framework is not adequate to counteract exclu-
sivity agreements between money transfer operators and other financial institutions or to facilitate 
for instance microfinance institutions to provide foreign exchange services which restricts to offer 
remittance related services (Ozceri 2000). Institutions such as the World Bank and IFAD are looking 
for ways to address these challenges in specific countries. As far as our data collection permitted, no 
evidence was found that the regulatory environment in partner countries is a specific focal area of 
the Belgian development cooperation. 
 Efforts should therefore be taken to assess to what extent the Belgian government or other actors of the Belgian 
development cooperation can play a role in rendering regulatory frameworks more conducive for remittance 
services and partnerships.  
V. Coordinating security and development regulatory frameworks 
Important to bear in mind is that these are not the only policy fields addressing remittances. In par-
ticular regulations relating to anti money laundering and terrorist financing measures pursue at times 
contradictory objectives. Furthermore, there is some confusion about the use of some legal terms 
and definitions between both legal documents and related acts at national level. (Lubambu 2014). 
From the interviews with representatives of the Belgian government we could conclude that there 
is currently no debate about the potential tension or conflict of interests between increasing the 
development impact of remittances and security issues in Belgium.15  
 There is thus not only a need for a coherent migration and development policy in Belgium but also for an 
alignment of security and development interests of remittance policies. An intensified effort to bring together 
the concerned governmental and other stakeholders to discuss these issues and design a coherent policy 
framework should therefore be a priority of a remittance policy.    
 
14  Se chapter one for the regulation in Belgium. 
15  Within Belgium important regulations includes the Law of 11 January 1993 on preventing use of the financial system for purposes of, 
see http://www.ctif-cfi.be/website/images/NL/law_be/loi01072016.pdf. The information that needs to accompany financial transfers 
is currently governed by the Regulation (EC) no. 1781/2006. However, this regulation will be withdrawn with effect from June 26, 2017 
by Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information accompanying transfers 
of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 (Text with EEA relevance), see http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/abb3dbb8-0b48-11e5-8817-01aa75ed71a1/language-nl. (information provided by representative of CTIF-CFI). 
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VI. Increasing access to remittance and banking services for undocumented migrants 
Undocumented migrants face specific problems of accessing formal remittance services, because in 
most countries, incl. Belgium, formal remittances channels can only be used on the presentation of 
an identify card. Some countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan and Mali, governments, 
have issued a specific document to their citizens abroad that allow them to return to their country, 
to obtain a driver’s license and to have access to financial services. Also the European Investment 
Bank and some countries along the Mediterranean have signed an agreement that undocumented 
migrants can use simple financial facilities upon presentation of consular registration cards 
(UNCTAD 2013, Lubambu 2014) However, not all financial institutions accept these. According to 
the Belgian regulation (see higher) remittance senders have to provide a proof of their identity. 
Important to note is that according to Belgian regulations, everybody who can provide proof of 
their identity and residence is allowed to have access to basic banking services16.  
 An information campaign involving the Belgian government and civil society and geared towards diaspora 
organizations, (un)documented migrants and financial institutions could raise awareness among concerned 
stakeholders about the existing rights for access to banking services. 
VII. Encouraging remittance partnerships, technologies and services  
Several international institutions have encouraged financial and other institutions which are 
particularly accessible to remittance senders and receivers living in remote areas or which deal with 
small amounts of money, to enter the remittance market. IFAD Financing Facility for Remittances 
(FFR) represents US$35 million in subsidies from different donors, to support innovate projects. 
Microfinance institutions are regarded as one of the best-placed institutions to provide services to 
receivers and of remittances (see Ozceri 2010). Besides microfinance institutions, postal offices may 
provide a solution for the limited access to remittances services. While the majority of bank and 
money transfer agencies are located in the urban areas, most postal offices can be found in rural areas. 
According to a survey of Clotteau and Ansón (2011) about 80% of the postal offices in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are located in rural areas. To activate this potential, international institutions such as IFAD 
have developed schemes to support and assist postal services in updating their infrastructure, 
developing remittances services and/or linking up with existing providers of remittance services. 
IOM and the FIAPP have – as some other institutions – published a guide with best practices on 
how to develop partnerships.17 According to the representatives of the Belgian government no such 
supporting schemes exist.  
New information and communication technologies have allowed to revolutionize the remittance 
market and to facilitate access to remittance services. This refers not only to internet banking, but 
also to partnerships between mobile phone companies and financial institutions. The best-known 
examples include M-PESA in Kenya, launched by Vodafone and Safaricom and G-Cash in the 
Philippines. While these solutions cater for internal remittances, new initiatives are on their way for 
extending services for money sent across borders (of instance Philippines Smart communications or 
transferwise). An example with a Belgian input is a joint venture between MasterCard, eServGlobal 
and Belgacom International Carrier Services, that intends to bridges the gap between the finance and 
telecommunication worlds by integrating the systems of multiple payment service providers, whether 
mobile or electronic wallets, traditional money transfer systems or banking systems (see figure 6). 
These solutions are only possible when there is adequate electricity and network connectivity and a 
legislation that allows these kind of partnerships to develop. Despite the current Belgian 
 
16 For more information on this topic (in Dutch), see Kruispunt Migratie en Integratie: http://www.kruispuntmi.be/nieuws/basisbankdienst-
voor-asielzoekers-en-vluchtelingen-veel-gestelde-vragen 
17  https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/manual_de_remesas_en.pdf 
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governments’ interest in the digital agenda for development, no specific measures have been taken 
to facilitate or support digital measures for international remittances.  
Figure 6 Presentation of HomeSend 
 
Source GFMD 2015: 76 
These measures also focus on developing services that allow senders to channel remittances to spe-
cific purposes, such as education, housing, business investment, or even public goods for a commu-
nity. Success of these initiatives differ and the economic and commercial viability should be closely 
monitored (for an overview see Hall 2010 and McKenzie & Yang 2014). For instance, a case study 
among El Salvadoran students supported by el Salvadoran migrants in Washington DC, showed that 
a remittance service directly aimed at channeling remittances in a so-called education account for the 
students was not used (unless matching funds were provided to top up the account). Other case 
studies to channel remittances directly to education facilities in the Philippines did also not attract 
great attention from potential clients (Adams et al. 2012). Properly designed market studies are 
therefore are therefore a prerequisite for potential success of such services (Ozceri 2010). In 
Belgium several money transfer operators have been exploring possibilities to set up partnerships 
with other financial institutions as well as providing particular remittance related services (for instance 
to buy houses, or to finance health care via hospitals). Unfortunately there is no coherent overview 
of these experiences available nor of what worked or did not work in specific conditions.  
 The development of partnerships, new technologies and new remittance services should be encouraged with 
supporting instruments (such as financial incentives and conducive regulatory frameworks and information 
provision). International agencies as well as the Belgian government, financial institutions and civil society 
organizations (incl. diaspora organizations) can play a role in this.   
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VIII. Banking the unbanked: Financial inclusion through financial literacy  
The aforementioned initiatives are part of a broader movement towards the financial inclusion of 
remitters and senders in the formal financial system, or put differently: banking the unbanked. Low-
income households are more prone to have limited knowledge of financial systems, distrust them, or 
merely do not have access to them (Ozceri 2010). A particular aspect of these measures is the focus 
on increasing the financial literacy of migrants and their families. Several donors and NGO’s have 
taken initiatives to increase financial inclusion through financial literacy, such as GIZ’s the Handbook 
on Financial Literacy for Remittances and Diaspora Investment, and Cespi’s - Good practices for 
financial inclusion. A European Overview (buonepratichedinclusione.it).  
 Similar instruments could be set up for (and with) the Belgian diaspora communities as well as their 
counterparts in the countries of origin. In Belgium, financial literacy and inclusion courses could be included 
of the integration trajectory courses. 
IX. Increasing the effects on the community level by supporting development oriented 
initiatives   
While most of the policies are aimed at individual remittances, some initiatives have focused on 
leveraging the development impact of collective remittances or supporting the spill-over effect of 
remittances on the community level. The French organization Grdr Migration - Citoyenneté – 
Développement has for instance developed an extensive methodology to analyze and augment the 
potential impact of migrants to the development of their region of origin, their region of destination 
and their integration in the country of destination. This methodology departs from a multi-actor 
approach, including not only migrants and their families in the country of origin but also the local 
authorities, civil society organizations and other stakeholders. Aim is to create a conducive 
institutional environment for leveraging the positive developmental  effects of remittances and other 
resources.18 Probably the best known example is the 3 for 1 programme of the Mexican Government 
in which different governmental levels match each dollar sent by diaspora (or so-called Home Town) 
organizations with three dollars – in order to construct public infrastructure. At regional and local 
levels in countries of destination, there are some examples of authorities or civil society organizations 
that provide either matching funds to diaspora organizations or capacity building programmes. In 
the past the Belgian government has supported some diaspora organizations (De Bruyn & Wets 
2004), as well as indirectly via other programmes and there have been initiatives of the King Baudouin 
Foundation (Migrasol). In addition, some regional or local governments support diaspora 
organizations, such as the City of Antwerp. However, there are no larger scale initiatives existent. 
 Civil society organizations, financial institutions and national or local government agencies in collaboration 
with diaspora organizations should explore possibilities for matching funds as well as measures to identify 
and address the current obstacles for upscaling the development impact of remittances to the community and 
regional levels.  
X. Engaging the diaspora in policy formulation 
In the 2000s, when the attention for migration and development accelerated, a much heard critique 
from members of the diaspora was that policy and academic discussions were mainly taking place 
without the involvement of the diaspora communities themselves. Since the beginning of the 2000s 
initiatives have been implemented to engage the diaspora communities, or at least representatives of 
these communities. For instance, the annual Forum on Migration and Development tries to reach 
out to the diaspora via the civil society day. The IOM and MPI publication ‘Developing a Road Map 
 
18 See http://www.grdr.org for more information.  
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for engaging Diasporas in Development’ offers suggestions to policy makers and practitioners. 
Remittances is one the themes which elaborated in this context.  
 Civil society organizations, governmental agencies and other stakeholders should engage (or continue their 
efforts) to engage to engage representatives of diaspora organizations in the agenda setting, policy development 
and implementation processes.  This also implies that the findings of this study as well as the recommendations 
should be assessed by (representatives of) remittance senders and receivers (incl. diaspora organizations) -  the 
main stakeholder in this context. 
XI. Financial instruments to improve macro-economic impact 
Since remittances are considered as stable and countercyclical source of external income, the World 
Bank and the IMF have allowed States to take remittances into account when deciding their levels of debt. More 
specifically, the World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework, launched in 2009, grants recipient 
countries of remittances to carry higher levels of debt when the ration of remittances is higher than 
10% of their domestic income and 20% of exported goods and services (Lubambu 2014). However, 
some authors (such as Chami et al. 2012, and Chami & Fullenkamp 2013), have argued that there is 
no clear evidence that fiscal space generated by remittances is used for policies and projects 
benefitting the population. Chami et al. (2012)’s cross section analysis of 111 countries even shows 
that relying on remittances as external financing mechanisms can lead to a worsening of institutional 
quality and corruption.  
‘Diaspora bonds’ is a financial instrument propagated by some international institutions and academics 
as a means to tap into the potential of remittances to finance development. These are debt 
instruments issued by a state, a sub-sovereign entity or private corporation to collect funds from the 
diaspora (Kektar & Ratha 2007). They are a means for the diaspora ‘to give something back’ to their 
country of origin. India and Israel have used these instruments to finance national infrastructure 
projects (such as schools, roads,..).  
 The Belgian development cooperation in collaboration with financial institutions and diaspora organizations 
could explore the feasibility of these type of instruments.  
XII. Taxing remittances or make them tax deductible 
Among international institutions, academics and civil society organizations there is a consensus that 
remittances should not be taxed because it would raise transactions costs and motivate senders and 
recipients to use informal channels. Moreover, there is also the argument that senders of remittances 
have already paid taxes when they received the income from labour. Furthermore, there is a risk that 
the remittance sums would be twice taxed: on the receiving and on the sending side. Some 
Governments such as the Philippines have therefore decided not to tax remittances (Lubambu 2014) 
Lured by the large sums of money and potential for expanding their state finances, some governments 
– in sending as well as recipient countries – are considering to tax remittances. In the sending sides 
the governments of Oman and the United Arab Emirates have be proposing such measures in 2013. 
For other reasons – namely to counteract drug money laundering, the State of Oklahoma has 
introduced a tax of US$ 5 on each transaction through a wire transfer and an additional 1% for each 
amount higher than US$ 500. At the recipients’ side, several governments, such as India, Ethiopia 
and Venezuela, tax remittances through recipients of remittance to convert the received funds at by 
government set official exchange rates.  
As an opposite strategy, remittance could be made tax deductible – this would encourage the use of 
formal channels and increase the side of remittance sent (or income for the senders of remittances). 
We did not come across any examples of countries that had made all remittances sent deductible 
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from taxes – but further research is necessary to confirm this. However, there are three exceptions 
in Belgium. Firstly, money sent for alimony purposes is deductible, as are donations to registered 
development aid institutions and remittances used for the purchase of stocks in development funds 
for microfinance in developing countries.19 To what extent these are known among the diaspora 
communities was beyond the scope of this study. 
 The Belgian government and/or civil society organizations should further explore the tax deductibility of 
remittances and assess to what extent the current possibilities are known to potential stakeholders.   
XIII Addressing broader contextual factors  
As mentioned in the previous some broader contextual factors should be addressed to minimize the 
negative development effect of migration, i.e. the socio-economic situation of the migrant or the 
diaspora (for instance in terms of integration in the labour market) and the extent to which the 
transnational character of migrants/diaspora and their family and migration is catered for in 
countries/regions influence the amount of remittances that s/he can send as well as the cultural and 
social impact of the migration process. It is beyond the scope of this study to present policy options 
on these broad themes20.  
6. Recommendations 
Before listing specific recommendations for the Belgian government, it is important to explicit the 
principles which frame the recommendations below.  
First of all, remittances are in essence private money flows – even if they might have developmental 
effects on a broader scale. Remittances are part of the income of men or women with a migration 
background on which can be assumed that already taxes have been paid. As the Inter-American 
Development Bank – one of the main international institutions that pioneered policy recommenda-
tions on remittances - already put it in 2004: ‘It’s their Money’ – referring to the senders of remittances. 
We reiterate here thus the premise that remittances are in essence a private money flow – which is 
not necessarily directed towards the poorest communities and regions, and that remittances cannot 
be regarded as a substitute for official development aid. Policies should therefore not be geared 
towards obliging senders or receivers to utilize (parts of) the remittances for specific purposes (by 
taxing remittances, or by taking a percentage of the sums sends to invest in development purposes). 
Instead, policy interventions should increase the options available for senders and receivers to send, 
receive or use remittances, or to create the institutional and policy framework to facilitate this. 
Secondly, senders and receivers constitute a very heterogeneous group of men and women. Remit-
tance behaviour and obstacles to send and receive and to utilize remittances diverge among senders 
and receivers own background and position in society and in the migration process. Policies should 
therefore take this diversity into account. Migration is a policy field in which interventions might have 
different effects depending on the geographical level (individual, household, community, region, 
country; country of destination or of origin), sectoral angle (economic, humanitarian, security) and 
temporal. While sometimes it will be possible to merge the different interests, most often decisions 
will have to be made to prioritize. It is necessary to be explicit about these decisions.  
 
19  Personal communication with representatives Federal Public Service Finances of Belgium. 
20 See for instance the chapter on Sweden in ICDPM & ECDPM (2013) for an example of policy which takes into account the transnational 
character of migrants.  
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The table on the next page lists 25 recommendations for the Belgian government and other actors, 
grouped according to main obstacles or challenges.21
 
21 In addition to the obstacles in table 6 of this paper, two additional policy issues (referring to coherent policy development and data 
collection) have been added, and some of the recommendations to address the underlying causes have been integrated in 
recommendations for the other challenges.  
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Challenges Recommendations Corresponding policy options  
Data collection   
A. There is insufficient and unspecific information available about volume and 
destination country of remittances via formal channels, which limits the 
possibility (1) identify bottlenecks (for instance corridors for which the use of 
formal channels is less than expected) to design focused policies for specific 
remittance corridors and (2) to identify potential contribution of remittances 
to developing countries.  
Urge the Belgian government to 
1. Improve data gathering by obliging remittance service providers to provide 
data about volume and destination countries (via balance of payments 
enquiries).  
Urge the Belgian government to  
2. Continue to adhere to the reporting requirements which are stipulated in the 
Payment Services Directive (PSD) 2007/64/EC 
 
II  
 
 
 
 
II 
Coherent policy    
B. There is no clear and coherent policy on remittance or migration and 
development or clear overview in Belgium – information is scattered around 
different agencies and departments. 
Urge the Belgian government to  
3. Design coherent policies and share information.  
4. Explore the implementation of the General Principles for Remittances services 
(see box 4)  
5. Coordinate their policies with the European policies and regulations. 
I, II 
C. Remittance and anti-laundering/counterterrorist initiatives might cater for 
opposite objectives.  
Urge the Belgian government to  
6. Analyze and address contradictions between anti-money 
laundering/counterterrorist and remittance legislation 
V 
Use of formal channels   
D. Unequal access to remittance services and banking for senders, in particular 
undocumented migrants. 
Urge the Belgian government and other governmental actors and banks to  
7. Implement the right to basic banking services.  
VI 
E. For certain remittance corridors and types of receivers and senders formal 
remittance channels are less attractive and accessible than informal channels 
(due to speed, transaction costs, legal access,…) 
Urge the Belgian government to  
8. Support measures to formalize remittance channels by stimulating the 
development of formal channels – NOT by limiting or closing down informal 
options 
9. Explore further fiscal deductibility of remittances 
I, III, VI, VII 
 
 
 
XII 
F. Transaction costs are too high, esp. for African countries Urge the Belgian government to 
10. Design focused policy to bring down transaction costs  
11. Deliver on commitment to bring down transaction costs to 3% 
12. Support specific measure to inform customers on comparing prices (e.g. 
World Remit) 
13. Support specific measure to facilitate competition and entry of new players 
and partnerships 
 
I, III, IV, VI, VII  
I, III, IV, VI, VII  
III  
 
I, VII 
G. Unequal access to remittance service for receivers Urge the Belgian government to 
14. Support development of financial sector in developing countries – including 
conducive and safe environment 
15. Support partnerships with MFI’s and Postal banks 
16. Discourage and combat monopolistic strategies 
17. Support mobile phone and internet banking services  
 
VII  
 
VII  
IV  
VII 
Productive use of remittance   
H. Limited options for utilization of remittances for private purposes Urge the Belgian government to  
18. Provide legal and financial incentives for pilot projects aimed at savings, 
credit (remittance backed loans), insurance, ..., entrepreneurship, social 
 
VII, VIII  
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(health, education, etc.). services by taking into account hat these initiatives 
need substantial and long term support 
19. Support market research 
20. Support Financial literacy programmes 
 
 
VII, VIII  
VIII 
Distribution and spill-over effect of remittances    
I. Inadequate use of potential multiplier effect of remittances for community level Urge the Belgian government and other governmental and civil society and private 
actors to 
21. Explore options for matching funds 
22. Explore the provision of options to fund development projects with 
remittances (on a voluntary basis) 
 
 
VIII  
VIII 
J. Inadequate use potential benefits of remittances on national level Urge Belgian government to  
23. Explore measures to develop remittances based financial instruments.  
 
XI 
Other underlying causes   
K. Diaspora organization are excluded from policy development Urge the Belgian government and other governmental and civil society and private 
actors to 
24.  Engage and include representatives of diaspora organizations and 
communities in agenda setting and policy development 
 
 
X 
L. Economic and social benefits due to transnational character of migration is 
limited 
Urge the Belgian government to 
25. Encourage transnational character of migrants and their families in order to 
allow transnational economic sectors (further research need into bottlenecks) 
 
XIII 
  
  
34 
Annex: Communication with information resource people 
Name Institution 
Mr Tom Neijens Cabinet Ministry of Development Cooperation (Minister Alexander De 
Croo 
Ms Carole Demol DGD - Migration 
Mr Koen Van Acoleyen DGD – Digital Agenda 
Mr Laurent Tasquin Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs 
Mr Patrik De Coster  Federal Public Service Finances 
Mr Marc Decok Federal Public Service Finances 
Mr Piet D’havé  National Bank of Belgium 
Mr Rudi Acx National Bank of Belgium 
Mr Marc Penna CTIF-CFI (Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking) 
Mr Dirk Vandaele Agentschap Integratie en Inburgering 
Mr Walter Van Wolputte De Post 
Ms Asli Ozceri Moneytrans 
Ms Marianne Pauwels HomeSend 
Mr Benjamin Kouasi Moneygram  
Mr Kwaku Acheampong FOS 
Ms Cécile Vanderstappen CNCD 
Ms Annika Cayrol Financité 
Mr Yves Delepeleire De Standaard 
Ms Lucia Alexandroae Eurostat 
Mr Valon Halimi IOM 
Ms Sonia Plaza World Bank 
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